Donald Trump has used an expression for America's war against Iran that, perhaps more than anything, reflects his effort to downplay a reality that is taking on ever-larger dimensions by the day: "small potatoes." It is a term used in English political and everyday language for a matter that is insignificant and marginal. But if the war with Iran is truly "small potatoes," why has the United States, after seven months, still not been able to close the file on it?
This very contradiction is one of the most important signs of the gap between the White House's political narrative and the strategic reality of the war. A war that, in Washington's initial calculations, was supposed to be short, limited, and decisive has now become a multilayered crisis whose effects have extended beyond the military battlefield into energy, the economy, budgets, regional security, and even US domestic politics.
From the beginning, Trump has invested in a specific calculation: that intense military pressure could force Iran to accept Washington's demands within a short period. This calculation, of course, was not only a mistake about Iran's military capability; the bigger mistake was the incorrect understanding of Tehran's political will to continue resisting.
Contrary to the war planners' assumptions, Iran did not become an actor that would quickly retreat from its positions as pressure increased. This very issue caused the equation that was supposed to end with a military strike to enter a process of attrition; a process that, the longer it lasts, the more its costs increase for the United States. This is where the phrase "small potatoes" comes into contradiction with reality.
A war cannot be measured solely by the number of military operations or the amount of damage inflicted on the opposing side. A war demonstrates its strategic importance when it can affect the economic and security order surrounding it. The Iran–US war has become a major crisis precisely from this point. The most important example is energy.
The Strait of Hormuz is of exceptional importance to the global economy and energy markets. Any sustained disruption to the passage of ships through this waterway is not just a military issue between Iran and the United States; it directly affects energy prices, transportation costs, industrial production, and ultimately the cost of living for people in various countries. For the United States, too, this issue is of particular importance. Rising fuel prices, at a time when American households are already facing cost-of-living pressures, can quickly turn from a foreign issue into a domestic political problem.
This is why Trump has repeatedly been compelled to speak about the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and the openness of shipping routes. If the war were truly a marginal matter, reopening and normalizing traffic through one of the world's most important energy waterways should not have become one of the main concerns of the US president. The problem, of course, is not only fuel prices.
Months of military operations mean massive consumption of munitions, wear and tear on equipment, the cost of moving forces, repairing and rebuilding damaged facilities, and increased operational costs. These costs are not visible at the moment a missile is fired, but they show up in the government budget and the financial bill of the war.
On the other hand, the cost of war does not drop to zero with the end of the conflict. Replacing equipment and munitions, rebuilding military infrastructure, paying costs related to injured personnel, and restoring the military's operational capacities to prewar levels could continue for years.
Forbes, in a report published on Saturday, also emphasized this very issue, warning that the end of the war does not necessarily mean the end of its costs for the United States and that the financial consequences of this conflict could last for decades. This point is highly significant from a political perspective; because Trump cannot erase the war's bill simply by declaring the end of operations.
In fact, perhaps Trump's greatest challenge is to connect the "military victory" he speaks of in his political rhetoric to a "strategic achievement" that is tangible for the American public.
The American voter will ultimately face a simple question: What did this war bring me?
If the answer is rising fuel prices, a higher cost of living, pressure on the public budget, and continued economic uncertainty, the victory narrative will not be sustainable for long.
This issue becomes even more significant given that, according to a recent poll published by the Financial Times, satisfaction with Trump's performance has fallen to 33 percent, with 64 percent of Americans dissatisfied with his performance. Even among Republicans, satisfaction with his economic performance is reported at only 53 percent. The Iran war is thus gaining a third dimension: US domestic politics.
Trump may be able to present his desired narrative about the military results of the war, but he cannot easily manage the economic experience of millions of Americans. People do not compare the price of gasoline, the cost of food, and the state of their bank accounts with White House statements; they see the result in their daily lives.
From this perspective, downplaying the war may be less a communication strategy and more a sign of concern about its consequences. The more the costs rise, the greater the US government's need will be to present a low-cost image of the war.
But the problem is that reality cannot be forever shrunk with words. Trump may be able to call the war "small potatoes," but seven months of war, the Strait of Hormuz, military costs, energy pressure, and declining public satisfaction present a completely different picture.
Ultimately, the measure of a war's success lies not in the president's description, but in the result it leaves behind. If the United States, after months of war, is still struggling to normalize traffic through Hormuz, contain economic costs, and explain the real achievements of this conflict, it is difficult to consider this war a small matter. Perhaps the real issue for Trump is that what he today calls "small potatoes" is turning into one of the largest foreign policy bills of his presidency; a bill whose most important part may be paid not in the Middle East, but inside the United States.
MNA