On August 24, 1954,President Getúlio VargasHe put an end to his own life, or, as he himself wrote in his farewell letter: "Left life to enter history." The politician was in his second term, considered by many historians as the most progressive period of his career in the Brazilian Executive.
The act of suicide, in and of itself, would generate repercussions, and in Vargas' case, it added another layer to the historical legacy he left in national politics.BdF InterviewAs of that dramatic moment, there was a complex political and economic network surrounding the president, according to historian Jorge Ferreira, a professor of Brazilian History at Fluminense Federal University (UFF).
According to the historian, the political group supporting Vargas had a national-development project focused on directed and state-fostered industrialization, whose foundations had been laid during his first term in power, between 1930 and 1945. “[During this period], the Vale do Rio Doce Company and the National Steel Plant were founded. The Vale do Rio Doce Company supplied the National Steel Plant. It was Brazil's first steel plant and the starting point for industrialization. The first hydroelectric power plant, which is the São Francisco one, was also created, and the National Petroleum Council was founded. It was not yet Petrobras, but it was the National Petroleum Council. These four initiatives formed the basis of Brazil's industrialization,” he highlights.
After completing his first term, Vargas resumed the presidency in 1950 "in the arms of the people" and prioritized the resumption of the economic development plan. He laid important foundations for the country by establishing essential institutions such as BNDES, Capes, and CNPq. However, he governed under fierce opposition in the National Congress, led by the National Democratic Union (UDN), which historically rejected the legitimacy of his electoral victory.
One of the biggest conflicts during this period involved the creation of Petrobras, driven by the strong popular appeal of the campaign "Our Oil Is Ours." Ferreira explains Vargas' strategy to approve state monopoly despite a hostile Congress. "Vargas was a very shrewd politician. He did the following: he sent a bill to the National Congress creating Petrobras without a monopoly, because he knew the people would take to the streets," he says.
The tactic worked as a kind of "reverse psychology." Pressured by the immense mobilization of unions, students, and left-wing military,the UDN caucuspresented a substitute bill that guaranteed the state monopoly of the company, merely to counter the original president's project, making the measure pass in the terms Vargas desired. "He had to make these maneuvers to move forward with his plans," he summarizes.
The 'Cabinet of Hate' and the Siege on the Presidency
The opposition, led by journalist and politician Carlos Lacerda, formed a true "cabinet of hate," a term historian Maria Celina de Araújo coined to describe the UDN caucus' daily behavior, characterized by systematic insults and accusations of corruption against the government without letup. "Every day a group of UDN politicians would go to the caucus to insult him and try to create a new issue. Carlos Lacerda was of terrifying aggression," he reports.
The political crisis reached its breaking point with the attack on Carlos Lacerda's life on Toneleiros Street, which resulted in the death of Major Rubens Vaz. The crime was planned and ordered by Gregório Fortunato, head of the presidential guard. Ferreira highlights that Vargas was entirely unaware of the plan, calling the action a "political primitivism" incompatible with the president's sophistication.
However, the military investigation, known as the Galeão Republic, went through Fortunato's personal files, revealing he had a R$ 32 million (in today's values) fortune, incompatible with his R$ 7,500 salary, and had intermediated suspicious real estate transactions with Vargas' own sons. "There was corruption happening behind his back. And what the opposition wanted? To destroy Vargas. The idea was humiliation," he emphasizes.
According to the historian, this was the final blow to the government's stability. The goal was for the president to be questioned in the inquiry. "Imagine a person with such a trajectory, sitting on a small chair, answering questions from captains and lieutenants. And then arrest them. That is, with this, you demoralize the myth. And, by demoralizing the myth, you also demoralize the political project, which is populism. That was the project. And Vargas realized this," he concludes.
A gesture of resistance
In the face of military pressures demanding his resignation or leave, Vargas retreated to his room in the early hours of August 24, 1954, and carried out his final political act. His iconic testament letter, denouncing local reactionary forces and the pressure from international economic groups, became a powerful tool for counter-attack. "Vargas made a political bet. Vargas took his body and tied it to the UDN. And they had to carry that guilt over time," he assesses.
The popular reaction to the suicide was immediate, with large demonstrations and riots in the streets that disrupted the opposition's coup plans and cornered the regime's adversaries.
When drawing possible parallels with current politics, Ferreira considers it "reckless to make certain types of comparisons," especially given the time gap. Nevertheless, he states that similarities can be found between Vargas and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)."Vargas lived during the Cold War, Lula lives in a different context. But comparisons can also be made. Often they are inappropriate, but often they are justified. I consider that the great political figure of Brazil in the 20th century was Getúlio Vargas," he argues.For him, both are charismatic leaders who place themselves above their own parties, are guided by strong political pragmatism, and defend a national economic development project inseparable from social inclusion. For this reason, Ferreira concludes that both attract the same liberal opposition that rejects state intervention in the economy and the rise of the working classes, facing, each in their own time, the relentless gears of political hatred. "I think both, in different contexts, different temporalities, defend similar projects, which is developmentalism, statism. Both defend the national heritage and not just material," he summarizes.
He believes that both leaders, each in their own era, advocate projects that are close to each other, such as developmentalism and statism, and defend the national heritage, not just the material one.
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TheBdF InterviewIt airs from Monday to Friday at 4 p.m., onBrazil's Fact Radio98.9 FM in Greater São Paulo.