Iran was able to show that it not only resists pressures but is capable of redefining the equation in its own favor.
In strategic US literature, there has always been an assumption that a combination of military pressure, economic sanctions, psychological operations, and persistent threats can change the strategic calculations of the other side. This model, known in international relations as “coercive diplomacy,” has been used against different countries over the past decades. However, the recent experience of the United States with Iran has once again indicated that this model does not work the same against all actors and that its success depends on the structural, political, and psychological characteristics of the target country.
In this framework, the Washington Post newspaper, citing US intelligence assessments, has reported that Donald Trump's strategy of increasing pressure and escalating the confrontation with Iran has reached a deadlock. According to the report, US intelligence agencies believe that Washington's military strikes will not be able to change Tehran's behavior or strategic positions. The report also emphasizes that continuing this trend, in addition to eroding the confrontation, will also create significant political costs for the White House; especially since American public support for the continuation of the war is declining.
This assessment is all the more significant when it comes from the very institutions that are tasked with measuring the effectiveness of US security and military policies. In other words, it is not simply a media analysis, but rather a sign of a new perception emerging within the US security decision-making structure, one that suggests the limitations of military means in changing Iran’s behavior.
But the main question is why the strategy that America has repeatedly employed in different parts of the world has not achieved the desired results against Iran?
The answer to this question must be sought in the essential difference between Iran and many countries that have previously been the target of US coercive policies. In political psychology theories, one of the most important factors in the success of external pressure is to create a sense of helplessness and psychological collapse in the target society. When society feels that the cost of resistance is much greater than the cost of retreat, the ground is prepared for a change in political behavior. However, if society views the external threat not simply as a security crisis, but as an attack on its national identity and independence, the result will be exactly the opposite.
In such circumstances, a phenomenon that political psychologists refer to as convergence against external threat is activated. The external threat largely marginalizes internal disputes, and society's main priority shifts to maintaining national security and preventing the enemy from succeeding. This is the same pattern that has been observed in many wars in history and is now visible in US intelligence assessments of Iran.
On the other hand, Iran is not merely and simply a military actor that can be measured by classical power criteria. Iran’s power structure is based on a set of hard and soft components; from military and missile capabilities to geopolitical depth, long experience in crisis management, rapid recovery capabilities and, most importantly, a high capacity to adapt to pressure conditions. For this reason, as the level of pressure increases, an important part of the country’s latent capacities is also activated; a capacity that is usually less taken into account in the initial calculations of pressure planners.
One of the major strategic errors of the United States is its linear view of the concept of power. In this view, it is assumed that by inflicting military or economic damage, the decision-making ability of the other party is reduced in the same proportion. However, in the case of Iran, the relationship between pressure and power is not necessarily linear. In many cases, external pressure has reproduced power rather than reducing it. The experience of four decades of sanctions, war, sabotage operations, and various types of security pressures has shown that Iran’s decision-making structure has, over time, developed numerous mechanisms to adapt to critical situations.
From the perspective of deterrence theories, the main goal of any military action is to change the calculations of the other side. If a military attack fails to create this change, then the goal of deterrence has not been achieved. The Washington Post report points to exactly this point; that the assessment of US intelligence agencies shows that military attacks have failed to change Iran's strategic behavior. This means that military means, contrary to initial expectations, have failed to create a new balance between the costs and benefits of Iran's decision-making.
Another important point is the difference in the way Tehran and Washington view the concept of time. American politicians, especially in the electoral environment, usually seek quick and demonstrable achievements. For them, the success or failure of foreign policy is largely tied to the domestic election cycle. In contrast, strategic decision-making in Iran is usually based on long-term time horizons. This time difference means that the strategy of attrition gradually imposes greater costs on American decision-makers than it does on Iran.
The other side of the story is American public opinion. The experience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that the American society has become highly sensitive to entering long wars. As the time of confrontation increases and no concrete achievement is achieved, the political pressure on the American government increases. For this reason, one of the most important concerns of American intelligence circles is not just the battlefield, but the domestic consequences of the continuation of this process for the Trump administration.
From a leadership psychology perspective, too, when a political leader bases a significant portion of his or her credibility on the success of a particular strategy, it becomes more difficult to back down. In such circumstances, the likelihood of continuing the policy increases even as the probability of success decreases—a phenomenon known in decision-making psychology as the “commitment trap.” This can lead decision-makers into a cycle in which they pay more to make up for past failures without achieving a different outcome.
Ultimately, what is seen in US intelligence assessments today is more than just a report on the state of the war, it is a tacit admission of the limitations of the pressure strategy against Iran. The experience of recent months has shown that a country with strategic depth, high resilience capacity, a coherent decision-making structure, and long experience in dealing with crises cannot necessarily be managed by models designed for other countries.
For that, it can be said that the main problem of America is not simply the failure of a military operation or the failure of a political tactic, but the ineffectiveness of an intellectual framework; a framework that assumed that increasing pressure would automatically lead to a change in behavior. While in the case of Iran, foreign pressure has not only not led to the weakening of strategic will, but has also activated hidden capacities of power, increased internal cohesion and strengthened the logic of resistance. From this perspective, American intelligence reports should be seen not simply as an assessment of a point in time, but as a sign of the beginning of a review of one of the most important assumptions of Washington's foreign policy towards Iran; an assumption that is now more distant than ever from the realities on the ground.
MNA