Wars are not decided only on the battlefield; sometimes the biggest defeats are the product of miscalculations and overconfidence in military power. The history of American foreign policy is full of examples in which weapons superiority has replaced realistic analysis of the strategic environment, and the result has been Washington being trapped in long, costly, and fruitless wars.
The forty-day war against Iran can also be evaluated from this perspective; a war that was supposed to change the balance in favor of the United States and its allies by demonstrating military power, but in practice became a test to reveal the restrictions of hard power.
Accordingly, the US magazine Foreign Affairs writes in a thoughtful analysis that on the eve of Operation "Epic Fury", the Pentagon had concluded that power alone could bring the United States a quick and decisive victory. This assessment was based on the assumption that the volume of fire, technological superiority, and operational capability of the United States would force Iran to retreat in a short time. But what happened on the ground was the opposite. Neither Washington’s strategic goals were achieved nor did Iran back down from its stances. In the words of Foreign Affairs, by surrendering to this fallacy, the United States is now caught in a hateful situation of its own making; a situation that has not only brought no lasting gains for Washington, but it has instead has also imposed heavy security, political, and economic costs on it. This assessment is critical of the way US policymakers view the concept of power. In recent years, the idea has repeatedly emerged in Washington that military superiority can replace accurate understanding of geopolitical realities and the will of regional actors. This same mentaltiy has previously faced the United States with profound challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both wars began with a decisive military superiority, but in the end, Washington’s desired political goals were not achieved, and the United States was forced to leave the scene after years of expense.
The same miscalculation was repeated regarding Iran. Some decision-making circles in the United States believed that military strikes could break Iran’s deterrence structure and force Tehran to accept Washington’s demands. However, the experience of the war showed that deterrence does not depend solely on the number of missiles or fighter jets, but rather on a combination of military power, recovery capacity, internal cohesion, political will, and readiness to bear the costs. Ignoring these components led to the failure of the initial US calculations.
Today, however, the situation has entered a new phase. Donald Trump is once again using an intimidation language about the possibility of military action, while political and economic pressure on Iran continues. This situation shows that Washington is once again at a point where it must choose between two different paths; either learn from past experience and accept that military means alone are not capable of solving this crisis, or follow the same trial and error path once again; A path that not only failed to achieve the stated goals of the United States in the past, but also imposed massive costs on the country.
Repeating the same failed hypothesis could have consequences beyond a limited military confrontation. The West Asian region today is much more complex than in the past. Simultaneous conflicts on several fronts, great power competition, energy crises, and the fragility of the global economy turn any escalation of tension into an international crisis. In such circumstances, any new military decision against Iran could set off a chain of reactions that would not be easy even for the United States to control.
Moreover, the experience of recent years has shown that the concept of deterrence in the region has changed. It is no longer possible to break the will of the other side simply by relying on air superiority or precision strikes. Regional actors have been able to create a variety of means of response, and this has significantly increased the cost of using military power. For this reason, many Western analysts also believe that a threat-based policy will strengthen the logic of deterrence and increase distrust, rather than changing Iran's behavior.
Another important point is the impact of this decision on the US global credibility. Great powers are not measured solely by their military might; their credibility also depends on their ability to make rational decisions, manage crises, and avoid getting caught up in wars of attrition. If Washington repeats the same miscalculation, it will send a message to the world that it has not yet established a balance between its military capacity and its political goals. Such a perception could further affect America’s international standing and encourage its rivals to test the limits of its power.
From this perspective, Foreign Affairs’ warning should be seen as more than a media critique. This analysis is actually a wake-up call for US decision-making structure; a warning that the main problem is not a lack of military power, but rather a mistake in assessing the realities on the ground and an overreliance on military means. The experience of the Forty-Day War showed that even the world’s largest army cannot change the complex political and security equations of the region to its liking by simply displaying power.
Now the US is once again faced with a fateful choice. Will its policymakers learn from past experience, or will the old temptation of military victory once again dominate their decisions? The answer to this question will not only determine the future of relations between Tehran and Washington, but will also affect regional security and even the international order. What is certain is that repeating a strategic mistake will not bring a different outcome. If America continues to believe that geopolitical realities can be changed by relying on force, it will likely find itself once again in what Foreign Affairs calls “a despicable situation of its own making,” a deadlock from which it will be much more difficult to escape than to enter.
MNA